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While people's dream may be to own a home，the major portion of the funds 
to purchase one must be borrowed. The market where these funds arc borrowed is 
called the mortgage market. This sector of the debt market is by far the largest in the 
world with an estimated figure of US$3.5 trillion at the beginning of 1990. 
The Mortgage-backed Securities market，bom in the U.S. in 1970，has 
grown in size and complexity faster than other fixed-income instruments in the recent 
decades. By June 1993, total outstanding of MBS were almost US$1.5 trillion. In 
1990s, the MBS extended to other major financial markets including United Kingdom, 
Japan and Hong Kong. 
Over the past twenty years, there is a property market boom in Hong Kong. 
The price of both residential properties and office properties have grown more than ten 
times of their original value. Most Hong Kong banks have around 40 percent of their 
portfolios in mortgages, the stability of the banking system is highly correlated with the 
prepay market. To reduce and diversify the risk from the mortgage loans, the 
Mortgage-backed Securities was introduced in Hong Kong in 1994. 
Four bond sales backed by residential mortgage loans totaling HK$3 billion 
were offered in 1994. They accounts for only 0.1 percent of the whole capital market. 
The slow-growing introductory phase of MBS may be caused by the following factors: 
uncertain political environment after 1997, Hong Kong residential property price 
inflation, limited liquidity, few securities with credit rating, and the risk of MBS itself. 
iv 
To enhance the development and popularity of MBS in Hong Kong, a 
number of factors including credit enhancement of securitized products, market 
infrastructure, and the liquidity of bond markets have to be improved. 
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As the dream of most Hong Kong people is to own a home, the property 
market is booming particularly in the last decade. According to the Hong Kong 
Government's price indices by class of private domestic residences, the residential price 
has a triple rise from 1988 to 1993. To cool the territory's overheated residential 
property market, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority imposed the 70 per cent ceiling 
on mortgage loans in November 1991 forcing home buyers to produce 30 per cent of 
the purchase price for their down payment. However, the house price inflation has not 
stopped until mid-1994. 
In Hong Kong, mortgage is the dominant vehicle for house financing. AU 
real estates virtually have been mortgaged. Mortgage is a pledge of property which 
refers'to some specified real estate, to secure payment of a debt. The debt is the loan 
given to the buyer of the house by a lender. If the property owner fails to pay the 
lender, the lender has the right to foreclose the loan and seize the property to ensure 
that it is paid off. been mortgaged. In connection to the property market boom, 
mortgage market also undergoes a rapid growth. The outstanding mortgage loan 
grows from $190 billion in December 1992 to $266 billion in December 
1994. [HKMA, 1995] ^  The property market becomes one of the major forces driving up 
1 Hong Kong Monetary Authority, "Report on the Survey of Residential Mortgages in Hong Kong," 
Hong Kong Monetary Authgoritv，24 January, 1995，p2. 
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the Hong Kong financial market and mortgage loan is the largest debt market in Hong 
Kong; far exceeding the securities and corporate bond markets. 、 
However, the unforecasted sharp rise in property market intensifies the risks 
and difficulties encountered by the mortgage originators. In mortgage loan market, the 
investors are exposed to four main risks: (i) interest-rate risk; (ii) prepayment risk; (iii) 
credit risk; and (iv) liquidity risk. Since a mortgage is a debt instrument, its price 
moves in an opposite direction from the market interest rate. Mortgage originators 
face the risk of loss in the event that general market interest rates change. In addition, 
borrower has the right to pay off all or part of the mortgage balance at any time. The 
uncertainty associated with the cash flow as a result of this embedded option is the 
prepayment risk. On the other hand, the borrower may default to repay the loan. This 
risk of loss is credit risk. The last but not the least, most mortgage loans are large, 
indivisible, long term and thus highly illiquid. Mortgage originators would suffer loss 
when the investment must be sold quickly. 
Apart from the above risks, mortgage originators suffer from two serious 
shortcomings in the presence of high and variable inflation: mismatch problem and tilt 
problem. Mortgage is a long-term asset financed by depository institutions which 
obtain funds from short-term deposits. The depository institutions, in fact, are 
engaged in a highly speculative and risky activity: borrowing short but lending very 
long. Before October 1994 when all interest rates were regulated, depository 
institutions were hard to conpete deposits for mortgage financing. Most people prefer 
to deposit funds in large reputable banks and deposit-taking conpanies. When the 
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interest rate ceiling for time deposit abolishes, keen conpetition among depository 
institutions emerges. To increase the availability of funds for long-term mortgage loan, 
depository institutions push up the interest rates to attract more funds at whatever 
duration. A mismatch between the periods of lending and borrowing loans thus 
occurs. Under the era of high inflation in which the interest rates are high, the rates 
difference between the lending and borrowing becomes smaller and the mismatch 
problem is more significant. This heightens the risks of mortgage originators'risks and 
lowers their profit. 
Furthermore, the small difference between lending and borrowing rates 
during high inflation will cause the lending institutions to become technically insolvent. 
It is because the institution's liabilities are related to the face value of its mortgage 
assets, but the market value of these assets (which is the present value of the cash flow 
due by the debtor，discounted at the current high rate) will be below the face value by a 
factor that is not too far from the ratio of the contractual rate to the current market 
rate. The mismatch problem lowers the attractiveness of traditional mortgages to 
investors. 
In the presence of inflation-driven high interest rates, mortgage repayments 
are actually in a "tilt" nature i.e. a high initial but low end. As most young people have 
little asset accumulation, they are unable to pay a multiple of what they need to pay in 
the preinflation period. The high initial payment has the effect of foreclosing home 
ownership to large segments of the population or forcing buyers to scale down their 
demands. The tilt problem would thus shut off many potential borrowers. 
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To resolve the above two problems, different types of mortgages are 
designed. For example, adjustable-rate mortgage (a loan whose contract rate is reset 
periodically in accordance with some appropriately chosen benchmark index) is 
developed to addresses the mismatch problem. Graduated-payment mortgage (with a 
fixed interest rate and term of the mortgage, the monthly mortgage payments is smaller 
in the initial years but then becomes larger in the remaining years) is specially designed 
to deal with the tilt problem. In Hong Kong, about 96 per cent of mortgage loans are 
arranged on a floating rate basis whilst the rest is on a fixed rate basis [HKMA, 1995]^  
Nonetheless, no mortgage loans could remedy both shortcomings effectively. 
To counter or at least limit the problems, we need to broaden the base of 
mortgage market to attract other investors besides deposit-taking institutions to 
provide a large and steady supply of funds to the market. In early 1990s，the focus of 
innovations is shifted from the design of different modes of mortgage loans to a new 
financial instrument which involved the pooling of mortgages and the issuance of 
securities collateralized by these mortgages. Such a lending system is called asset 
securitization. If the assets collateralizing the securities are mortgage loans, the 
securities are known as mortgage-backed securities. Mortgage-backed security is 
first introduced into Hong Kong in 1994. Up till now, four mortgage-back securities 
totaling HK$3 billion are sold. This financial innovation has various benefits for 
issuers, borrowers, and investors as well as having far-ranging implications for the 
whole financial system. 
1 Hong Kong Monetary Authority, "Report on the Survey of Residential Mortgages in Hong Kong," 
Hong Kong Monetary Autheoritv，24 January, 1995, p2. 
5 
The objectives of the project are: (i) to understand this new-developed 
financial instrument; (ii) to study the development of mortgage-backed securities in 
Hong Kong; and (iii) to forecast the future market. The project will be divided into 
five main parts. The first part, from Chapter 2 to 3, describes the characteristics and 
advantages of issuing Mortgage-back securities. The second part. Chapter 4，studies 
methods for valuing the Mortgage-backed securities. The third part. Chapter 5 and 6， 
covers the development of Mortgage-back securities in U.S. and Hong Kong. In the 
fourth session, Chapter 7, discusses the current development of the security market 
and the last chapter will give recommendations and forecast the prospect of the Hong 
Kong Mortgage-backed securities market. 
‘ \ , . . 




INTRODUCTION OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 
Mortgage-backed security is a new innovation which becomes popular in the 
recent decade. Besides the basic mortgage pass-through security, it gives rise to a 
large number of derivatives to meet the needs of a broader investor group. This 
chapter will provide an overview of the Mortgage-backed securities: the characteristics 
and the various types of Mortgage-backed securities products. 
What is Securitization 
Securitization is the process of restructuring financial assets into securities 
that can be sold in liquid bond markets i.e. disintermediation. It is a transfer of funds 
by investors from the low-paying depository institutions toward direct investment in 
final lending and other intermediaries, in response to higher market rates. Among a 
number of suitable financial assets which can be collateralized to create securities such 
as residential loans, automobile loans’ credit card receivable and leases receivable etc.， 
residential mortgage loans is found to be the best asset to be securitized. The 
securitization business began in United States in 1968. In 1990s, it grows rapidly and 
extends to other major financial markets including United Kingdom, Japan and now 
Hong Kong. 
Upon the introduction of asset securitization, the lending system is radically 
different from the traditional financial system. More than one institutions such as 
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property developer may be involved in lending capital. The lending scenario may look 
as follows: (i) a commercial bank or property developer can originate a mortgage loan; 
(ii) the commercial bank or property developer can sell its mortgages to an investment 
banking firm or by itself to create a security backed by the pool of mortgages; (iii) the 
investment banker can obtain credit risk insurance for the pool of mortgages from a 
private insurance corrpany; (iv) the investment banker can sell the right to service the 
loans to another corrpany specializing in serving mortgages; and (iv) the investment 
banking firm can sell the securities to individuals and institutional investors. The 
change in financing the mortgage loans is shown in the following diagram: 
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DIAGRAM 1 
METHODS OF MORTGAGE FINANCING AFTER INTRODUCTION 
OF ASSET SECURITIZATION 
Traditional Mortgages Marketable Mortgages 
Borrowers Borrowers 
\1/ \1/ 
Financial Institutes Mortgage Originator 
such as Banks, such as Commercial Banks, 
Deposit-taking Institutes Property Developer 
Nl/ 
Depositors Mortgage Guarantees 
e.g. Insurance Company 
n1/ 
Mortgage Pools Organizers 
e.g. Commercial Banks, 
Investment Banks 
Claims sold to investors 
i.e. Pass through securities, CMOs's 
Source: “ Money and Capital Markets，，，Miles Livingston, New York Institute of 
Finance, 1993. 
Types of Mortgage-backed Securities 
The basic mortgage-backed security is the mortgage pass-through security. 
From this primitive security, derivative mortgage-backed securities are created: 
coUaterized mortgage obligations and stripped mortgage-backed securities. 
Mortgage Pass-through Securities 
\ 
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Pass-through securities are created when one or more holders of mortgages 
pool their mortgages together and sell undivided shares or participation certificates in 
the pool. The originator continues to service the mortgages including collection of 
payments and "passing through" the principal and interest to the security holders after 
the deduction of the servicing, guarantee and other fees. The security holders receive 
pro rata shares of the resultant cash flows. 
According to the amortization schedules established for each individual 
mortgage, a portion of the outstanding principal is received each month. Complete 
return of the principal and the final maturity of the pass-through occurs when the last 
payment in the pool is completed. However, the principal on individual mortgages in 
the pool can be prepaid in whole or in part at any time before the maturity of the 
security without penalty. Thus, there is a considerable uncertainty about what its 
actual maturity will be. Holding a diversified portfolio of mortgages in the form of a 
mortgage pass-through security can reduce most unsystematic risk (the risk of an 
adverse change in the prepayment speed that is not attributable to a change in 
mortgage interest rates). However, the systematic prepayment risk which is related to 
the change in mortgage interest rate, is still unavoidable. 
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations 
Collateralize mortgage obligation (CMO) is a dynamic innovation in the 
mortgage securities market. CMO generally retains most of the yield and credit quality 
advantages of pass-through security, while eliminating the uncertainty of the actual 
• . 、 ， , 
- ‘ ‘ > 
、 
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maturity of a mortgage-backed security to meet the needs of a broader investor 
groups. 
CMO is a security backed by a pool of pass-through securities or whole loan 
mortgages. It is so structured that there are several groups of bondholders with 
different stated maturities. Each class of bond is known as a tranche. The key 
difference between traditional pass-through and CMO is the principal payment process. 
Unlike the pass-through security in which holders receive some return of principal each 
month and the conplete return of principal occurs only when the final mortgage in the 
pool is paid in full, the principal payments in CMO are made in a sequential basis with 
all principal going to the shortest maturity tranche first until it is retired. After the 
shortest maturity bonds are retired, all principal payments received will apply to the 
next tranche in the schedule. This pattern will be repeated until the final GMO tranche. 
CMO is in^ortant because it could use cash flows of long maturity monthly 
pay collateral to create securities with intermediate- and long-maturities having an 
expected average lives. The availability of shorter average life CMO tranches fulfill the 
needs of investors requiring lower duration and faster return of principal. It widens the 
range of investment and fulfills the needs of the universe investors. Since CMO 
redirects cash flow from a pass-through to different bond classes, it redistributes the 
prepayment risk so as to offer a greater degree of protection against call and 
reinvestment risk to the longer CMO classes. 
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When the sequential-pay CMO becomes mature, numerous innovations in 
structuring CMO have further been derived. The derivative products include accrual 
bonds, floating-rate and inverse floating-rate bonds, planned amortization class (PAC) 
bonds，companions with schedules, targeted amortization class (TAC) bonds and CMO 
residuals etc. These innovations enable the securities to have: (i) a greater stability of 
cash flows over a wide range of prepayment speeds; (ii) a better matching of floating-
rate liabilities; (iii) a substantial upside potential in a declining interest rate 
environment, but less downside risk in a rising interest rate environment; or (iv) a 
greater usefulness for hedging mortgage-related products. Owing to the better credit 
quality, these CMOs usually get triple-A rating by the major commercial rating 
agencies. 
Stripped Mortgage-backed Securities 
Stripped mortgage-backed security (SMBS) is a security which divides 
principal and interest generated from the underlying pool of mortgage from on a pro 
rata basis to on an unequal basis. It results that some of the securities created will 
have a price/yield relationship different from that of the underlying mortgage pool 
There are three types of SMBS: (i) synthetic-coupon pass-throughs; (ii) interest-only / 
principal-only securities; and (iii) CMO strips. 
Synthetic-Coupon Pass-through is the first generation of stripped 
mortgage-backed security. The unequal distribution of coupon and principal is in a 
synthetic coupon rate different from that of the underlying collateral. 
\ 
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Interest-Only / Principal-Only Strip is the security where all interest is 
allocated to one class (the interest-only class) while all the principal to the other class 
(the principal-only class). The interest-only class receives no principal whilst the 
principal-only class gets no interest. The principal-only security is purchased at a 
substantial discount from par value. But the interest-only security is purchased when 
there is no par value. The yields of the two securities are asymmetric to each other 
depending on the speed at which prepayments are made. For the principal-only 
security, the faster the prepayment, the higher the yield the investor will realize. In 
contrast, an interest-only investor hopes the prepayment to be slow. It is because as 
prepayments are made, the outstanding principal will decline and less dollar interest 
will be received. If the prepayments are too fast, the interest-only investor may not 
receive the amount paid to the security. 
CMO Strips are tranches within a CMO issue which receive only principal 
or interest cash flows or have synthetically high coupon rates. A CMO strip may be a 
PAC or TAG. When a CMO strip is a principal-only class that is neither a PAC nor a 
TAG, it is called a Super-PO. This relates to its quick paid-off rate if the prepayments 
increase as interest rates decline. 
SMBS is highly sensitive to change in prevailing interest and prepayment 
rates and it can display asymmetric returns. This enables investors to take strong 
market positions on expected movements in prepayment and interest rates. Principal-
only SMBS is a bullish instrument which outperforms in declining interest rate 
environment whilst interest-only SMBS is a bearish investment that can be used to 
13 
hedge against rising interest rate. Apart from acting as a hedge against interest rate 
and prepayment exposure of other mortgage securities, SMBS can combine with other 
fixed-income securities to enhance the total return of the portfolio in varying interest 
rate scenarios and to tailor-make the investment portfolio to meet the duration of 
liabilities and minimize interest rate risk. Thus, SMBS is a favorable mortgage-backed 
security in the market. 
14 
CHAPTER in 
BENEFITS OF SECURITIZATION 
Securitization of mortgage loans brings benefits to all parties as well as the 
financial market. The following is a summary of the major advantages to issuers, 
investors and borrowers，and its far-reaching implications to the financial market 
Benefits to Issuers 
Among the many advantages of securitization to issuers, the most common 
and important ones are: (i) diversification of funding sources and increased liquidity; 
(ii) cost effective source of funds; (iii) efficient use of capital; (iv) rapid portfolio 
growth; (V) better asset/liability management; and (vi) earnings enhancement. 
Diversification of Funding Sources and Increased Liquidity 
Access to the securitization market offers issuers who ordinarily could not 
make mortgage loans, an additional source of funding and liquidity. Generally, buyers 
in the securitization market are not drawn from the existing universe of investors in 
debt market. It will not reduce but enlarge the market for lender's traditional debt. It 
provides more source of capital for both financial and non-financial entities. It 
increases both the real and perceived liquidity of the issuer's balance sheet and hence 




Cost Effective Source of Funds 
High quality of assets allows a securitized offering to be achieved at a lower 
cost than by traditional financing. The cost of funding through securitization depends 
on its credit rating. The lower the credit rating, the higher the cost of funding. Using 
mortgage loans as collateral to structure a desirable security, the mortgage-related 
institution can obtain a higher credit rating and thus a lower cost of funds. 
Efficient Use of Capital 
As financial institutions have to comply with the capital guideline 
requirement to hold a certain percentage of capital for each asset category, the sale of 
assets can free up capital. The retain percentage is supposed to reflect the credit risk 
associated with the asset. However, for the sake of safety, the capital requirements are 
often higher than the actual risks. Hong Kong banks can have a maximum of 40 per 
cent of their loan portfolios in mortgages. The amount of money they must set aside is 
large. Securitization allows lenders to sell off big chunks of assets, lowering the 
reserve requirements. In addition，it shifts the credit risk from the originator of the 
loan to another party reducing the lender's risk. This results a reduction of excess 
capital requirements. 
Rapid Portfolio Growth 
As the business of a financial or non-financial entity grows, its growth 
potential will be limited by capital constraints. Selling assets through securitization 
provides a quick means for raising capital while keeping the asset. The removal of 
V 
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assets from the balance sheet by this method can avoid capital requirements, but 
improve financial ratios and gives room for additional assets. The risk-based capital 
guidelines for banks encourage the practice of securitization of assets. 
Better Asset/Liability Management 
Since mortgage and consumer installment loans expose financial institutions 
to prepayment risk, it is hard to establish a liability structure consistent with the 
structure of the uncertain cash flow of these assets. Securitization passes the 
prepayment risk to the investor. It can achieve an exact correspondence between the 
characteristics of an asset and the funding for that asset. This match can thus be 
maintained without any active management. 
Earning Enhancement 
Earnings to Business can be enhanced by the fee income through increased 
origination and servicing fees. Increased fee income with no corresponding increase in 
assets or equity improves return on assets and return on equity. 
Benefits to Investors 
Securitization converts illiquid loans into securities with greater liquidity and 
less credit risk which is favorable to investors. The two layers of protection provided 
are: (i) a diversified pool of loans; and (ii) the credit enhancement or insurance agency 
which put limits on the amount of the liabilities. Furthermore, securitization improves 
returns to investors through reduction of the cost of intermediation. 
\ 
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Benefits to Borrowers 
Since a financial or non-financial entity can securitize a loan it originates, the 
illiquid asset hold by the lender can be repackaged to turn into a liquid and safe 
financial instrument. As it can be sold in security market whenever capital is needed, 
the competition among originators is lesser. Hence the lender could produce loans with 
a lower lending rate spread than the one in other loan markets for the borrowers. 
Implication of Securitization for Financial Market 
Securitization has major inplications for financial markets as well as the 
operation of financial institutions such as banks and thrifts. It may eventually replace 
the conventional indirect financing system. 
At present, financial intermediaries, particularly banks and thrifts, play three 
inportant roles in the financial market. Firstly, they act as conduits in bringing savers 
and borrowers together. Banks and thrifts are in a better position to assess credit risk 
and to diversify the risks over many borrowers. Secondly, they provide maturity 
intermediation to acquire short-term funds from investors and to grant long-term loans 
for borrowers. Last but not least, they carry out denomination intermediation to 
transform many small investments to large-denomination loans for borrowers. Under 
the current mortgage financing system, banks and thrifts are the major originators and 
bearers of mortgage loan risks. They will in turn pass these risks to borrowers in form 




Securitization short-circuits the traditional intermediaries to provide a direct 
financing between borrowers and investors. Funds can flow efficiently from investors 
to borrowers. Pooling of assets reduces credit risk to a more acceptable level for 
investors. Recasting cash flows such as in CMOs generates securities with different 
maturities for wide range of investors. Furthermore, the availability of securities with 
smaller denominations than the underlying loans accomplishes denomination 
intermediation. As securitization can perform duties of traditional financial institute， 
the importance of banks and thrifts face a great challenge. 
On the other hand, under the new mortgage financing system, most banks 
and thrifts would take up the role of organizers for coordinating mortgage pool, rather 
than originators only. They can hold fewer mortgages in their portfolios. Thus，they 




MODELING AND VALUATION OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 
Institutional or individual investors who own or contemplate owning 
Mortgage-backed securities need a method for valuing them. The central issue in all 
MBS valuation methods is the treatment of prepayment under uncertainty since the 
mortgage owners' right to prepay their loans introduces a significant degree of 
uncertainty to the cash flows, and consequently the value, of MBSs. 
The relationship between interest rates and prepayment rates directly 
influences MBS pricing. Moreover, the dependence of prepayment rates on interest 
rates also affects their interest rate risk. Modified duration, traditional measure of the 
price sensitivity of fixed income securities, gives the percent change in price caused by 
the basis point shift in the yield curve as those securities have constant cash flows. 
However, it is inadequate for MBSs, as prepayment rates, and consequently cash 
flows, vary as interest rates change. 
The inadequacy of traditional fixed income analytical tools for valuing MBSs 
has led to the development of alternative methods. Multiple approaches for valuing 
MBSs exist because no single methodology has been shown to explain completely the 
price performance of these securities. Each method has its strengths and weaknesses. 
1 
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In this chapter, we are going to review three popular approaches to quantifying MBS 
return and risk characteristics. 
Static Cash Flow Yield (SCFY) Analysis 
This methodology is the sinplest to use，but it offers little insight into the 
relative value of an MBS. [Fabozzi, 1993]^  It ignores a number of factors critical to 
the valuation of MBSs by assuming constant future interest rates. 
The SCFY is the discount rate that equates the value of future MBS cash 
flows with their market price. The future cash flows are projected based on the 
prepayment rate that is anticipated if interest rates remain stable for the life of the 
security. The only required assumption of this method is a prepayment projection. 
After a prepayment has been specified, cash flows can be generated and a yield can be 
calculated based on the security's market price. Typically, prepayment projections are 
made based on the results of a statistical analysis of historical prepayment data，and are 
generally quoted as conditional prepayment rate (CPR) or percentages of the Public 
Securities Association (PSA) prepayment model. As it implies a confidence level, 
which in turn implies a range of possible values for MBS. 
From SCFY analysis, you can obtain the following two measures: 
1 Fabozzi’ Frank J., "Bond Markets: Analysis and Strategies," Prentice Hall International Editions. 
1993,p.360- p.369. 
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Weighted Average Life (WAL) of a MBS is the average time to receipt of 
the principle of the security. It is used as a measure of the effective maturity of MBS 
in the place of stated maturity as most principle is amortized or prepaid well before the 
stated matured date. 
Net present value (NPV) in static cash flow yield is conputed by adding 
the series of projected monthly cash flows to the Weighted Average Maturities 
(WAMs) and discounting them back to present value, as follows: 
cfi Cf2 cfn, 
NPV = + + 
(l+r)d (1+r 严（1+r 广 
where 
cf = cash flow for/th period (usually one month) 
m = to maturity 
r = investor-required discount rate (IRR) 
d = interest-free delay expressed as a fraction 
Advantages and Limitations 
The major attractions of the SCFY methodology are its sinplicity and its 
acceptance by the market as the standard measure of MBS value. The only 
assun^tion required is a prepayment projection which may be selected that best 
reflects the nature of the collateral and the Weighted Average Coupon (WAC) of the 
underlying mortgages. 
The chief limitation of SCFY is its static nature. It assumes constant future 
interest rates. It does not adjust the prepayment assumption to allow for prepayment 
volatility. Moreover, it ignores a number of factors critical to the valuation of MBSs, 
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including the shape of yield curve, the distribution and volatility of future interest rates, 
and the relationship between interest rates and MBS prepayment rates. 
A historical analysis of SCFY spreads is a useful adjunct to the other 
valuation methodologies discussed later. In particular, SCFY approach is most useful 
for the high premium and deep discount MBSs having cash flows with little sensitivity 
to interest rates. 
Total Rate of return Scenario Analysis (SA) 
SA improves on the SCFY methodology by projecting MBS performance in 
a limited set of interest rate scenarios. The manner in which the future interest rate 
paths are selected and the specification of the relationship between interest rates and 
MBS prepayment rates are critical to the SA. 
The most rigorous simulation of MBS performance is measuring the total 
rate of return against a predefined holding period return (HRR)，a process referred to 
as scenario analysis or horizon analysis. Required assumptions for this methodology 
includes holding period, prepayment rate function, interest rate distribution and 
volatility, central scenario, horizon pricing model, number of scenarios simulated and 
reinvestment rate. [Fabozzi, 1992]^  
1 Fabozzi, Frank J.，"The Handbook of Mortgage Backed Securities", Probus Publishing Company. 
1992,p.659-p.685. 
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The components of total rate of return consist of coupon income, the 
scheduled principle plus prepayments and other unscheduled principles (defaults), 
reinvestment incomes on all P&I cash flows，and market gains or losses recognized 
upon termination of a predefined holding period (horizon). Total rate of return is 
expressed as 




TR = total return 
PVb= the price of the investment at the beginning of the holding period 
PVe = the price at the end of the period 
PI = the total PI payments received over the period 
R = the total reinvestment income received over the holding period 
SA is a simple but useful alternative horizon pricing model values the MBSs 
based on SCFY spreads and projected horizon prepayment rates. The scenario horizon 
prepayment rate determines MBS WAL at the horizon. A MBS is then priced at a 
spread to its WAL-matched Treasury issue. Scenario spreads are determined by the 
SCFY spreads at which the same relative coupon MBS are currently trading. 
Advantages and Limitations 
The SA approach extends the SCFY methodology by examining the dynamic 
nature of MBSs. It can be used in conjunction with other MBS pricing models to 
access their implications for the dynamic performance of MBSs in a holding period 
return context. SA has the advantage of delineating the available sets of MBS 
risk/return profiles for specific holding periods. However, SA only works well with 
1 
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simple and limited number of scenarios. That may not adequately model the effect on 
value of the complete distribution of future interest rate paths. 
Option Adjusted Spreads (OAS) 
What is option-adjusted spread? The OAS measures relative value. It calculates expected 
yield spread of the MBS over the entire Treasury curve adjusted for the value of the prepayment call 
options embedded in the MBS. The value of the option is a function of the homeowners' economic 
incentive to refinance. [Bartlett,1994]‘ 
OAS models extend SA by simulating MBS performance over numerous 
interest rate paths. The OAS simulation approach generates numerous interest rate 
paths that then determine future MBS cash flows. These cash flows are discounted by 
the simulated interest rates plus the option-adjusted spread. The simulation approach 
provides a method for estimating MBS yields and spreads to the Treasury yield curve 
that are adjusted for the embedded options in these securities. In addition，these 
models can provide estimates of MBS option cost and effective MBS duration and 
convexity. 
One of the two critical assunptions in the OAS simulation methodology is 
the link between interest rates and prepayment rates. If the relationship is misspecified, 
the calculated value and risk measures will be biased. The second critical assumption 
is the specification of the interest rat diffusion process. Most models diffuse a single 
short-term rate. That is, the current MBS coupon, is assumed to shift deterministically 
1 Bartlett, William W., "The Valuation of Mortgage-Backed Securities", IRWIN Professional 
Publishing. 1994, p.96-p.l35. 
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based on the change in the short-term rate. Other models seek to introduce a greater 
amount of realism into the interest rate process by diffusing both a short- and long-
term rate. The long-term rate is used to drive the prepayment function, while MBS 
cash flows are discounted backed along the short-term rate paths. 
In addition to the above two critical assumptions, an assumption about 
interest rate volatility has to be made. Since MBSs are actually a long position of 
bonds and a short position in a call option, increasing interest rate volatility will 
increase calculated option cost and decrease option-adjusted spread. OAS values are 
also sensitive to the method used to aggregate the information from the individual 
interest rate paths. Therefore, averaging methodology is also inportant to OAS 
models. 
An OAS model is constructed upon a series of building blocks. In sequential 
order these are: 
• An interest rate model is used to generate a series of future interest rate paths，or 
yield curves. 
• A prepayment model is used to forecast the changes in pool cash flow according to 
the interest rate paths generated and the specific collateral characteristics selected. 
The prepayment projection is dependent upon projected interest rate paths and 
demographic influences on mortgage pool life. 
• A cash flow model is used to calculate the monthly distributions of P&I according 
to the projections of the prepayment model. 
1 
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Two values measures are produced by OAS models: option-adjusted spread 
and option cost. Most of the OAS models define OAS as the spread that equates the 
average simulated price to the market price. The option cost measures the prepayment 
risk embedded in the security and equates to the difference of the static cash flow 
spread and the OAS. 
Advantages and Limitations 
The OAS methodology has a number of advantages over both the SCFY and 
SA approaches. Firstly, OAS models simulate a large number of future interest rate 
paths which may better model the corrplete distribution of future rate paths, and 
inprove the statistical significance of the risk and return measures. Secondly, the risk 
measures account for the dependence of MBS prepayments on interest rates. The 
major drawback to the OAS approach is its corq)lexity. The prepayment functions and 
term structure models embedded in OAS models are generally proprietary. It is 




THE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKET IN US 
U.S. has the most highly developed capital market. It provides the most 
different kinds of capital market instruments in the world. Mortgage-backed securities 
was also innovated in U.S. and now becomes the predominant capital market 
instrument traded in US. A thorough understanding of the largest Mortgage-backed 
securities market can shed light on how to develop a Mortgage-backed securities 
market in Hong Kong. This chapter gives a brief picture of Mortgage-backed 
securities market in US. 
U.S.Capital Market 
Stocks, bonds and mortgages are the three principal instruments traded on 
the U.S. Capital market. There are about US$ 5 trillion of bonds (treasury, municipal, 
corporate and agency securities) outstanding while the total capitalization of the stock 
market is about US$ 4 trillion. The entire U.S. mortgages account for over US$ 4 
trillion. Among these mortgages, one-third of them which is equivalent to 12 percent 
of the U.S. Bond Market, have been securitized. 
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Market Structure of Mortgage-backed Securities in US 
Mortgage Originators 
The principal originators of residential mortgage loans in U.S. are thrifts, 
commercial banks and mortgage banks. Other private mortgage originators are life 
insurance conpanies and pension funds. In 1990，the three major mortgage originators 
have made US$ 475 billion i.e. about 98 percent，of the US$ 485 billion residential 
mortgages loans. As of December 1993, the outstanding mortgages have been up to 
over US$ 4 trillion. Prior to 1990，thrifts were the main originators followed by the 
commercial bank. Starting from 1990，mortgage bankers' share of origination became 
the largest. 
Mortgage originators will: (i) hold the mortgage in their portfolio; (ii) sell 
the mortgage to an investor who wishes to hold the mortgage or who will place the 
mortgage in a pool of mortgages to be used as collateral for the issuance of a security; 
or (iii) use the mortgage themselves as collateral for the issuance of a security. 
Since investing in mortgages exposes the investors to credit risk, interest-
rate risk, liquidity risk and prepayment risk, more and more mortgage originators open 
their doors to disintermediation for a steady and secured supply of funds for the 
mortgage market. Apart from the mortgage originators themselves, they can sell the 
mortgages to conduits which are federally sponsored credit agencies or private 
companies, to pool the mortgages to issue securities. 
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Mortgage-backed Securities Issuers 
In US, Mortgage-backed securities can be issued by mortgage banks， 
commercial banks, thrifts, conduits and agencies. However，nearly 98 percent of all 
pass-through securities are created by three major agencies. They are: Government 
National Mortgage Association (GNMA or "Ginnie Mae")，Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or "Freddie Mac") and Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA or "Fannie Mae"). The securities associated with these three 
entities are called agency pass-through securities. The rest are privately issued which 
are known as non-agency / conventional mortgage pass-through securities. The 
difference in issuance of agency versus non-agency mortgage-backed securities from 
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Goldman Sachs Asia L.L.C" August 25,1994. 
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Among the three agency mortgage pass-throughs, Ginnie Mae is a risk-free 
pass-through like Treasury securities. Ginnie Mae is a federally related institution, part 
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Its pass-throughs are 
guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government. In contrast, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mae are corporate instrumentalities of the U.S. Government. They 
do not receive a government subsidy or appropriation, and are taxed like other 
corporation. Their stocks are traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Therefore, 
they are more appropriately referred to as federally sponsored agencies or government 
sponsored entities. Nonetheless，these three agencies purchase only conforming 
mortgages. A conforming mortgage is one that meets the underwriting standards 
established by themselves for being in a pool of mortgages underlying a security that 
they guarantee. 
Thrifts, commercial banks and other private conduits which would purchase 
nonconforming mortgages, coUaterized these nonconforming mortgages in the 
underlying pool to issue non-agency securities in 1977. The first non-agency pass-
through securities was publicly introduced by Bank of America. Unlike agency pass-
throughs, the non-agency mortgage pass-throughs must be registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and are rated by commercial rating agencies 
such as Moody's and Standard & Poor，s. However，the development of private credit 
enhancement becomes the key success of this market. Although the amount of non-
agency pass-through securities is small (less than 25 percent) to agency pass-through 
securities, it is expected that this market will grow significantly in the coming years. 
V 
32 
Derivatives of Mortgage-backed Securities 
The first Mortgage-backed security is mortgage pass-through security which 
was created in February 1970. As the investor in a pass-through security is exposed to 
the total prepayment risk associated with the underlying pool of mortgage loans, a new 
security structure was introduced by Freddie Mac in 1983. This was collateralized 
mortgage obligation (CMO). In this structure, backed by mortgage pass-through 
securities and whole loans, the total prepayment risk is divided among classes of 
bonds. Following the sequential pay or plain vanilla CMOs, planned amortization 
class bonds (PACs), targeted amortization class (TAG) and reverse TAC are 
sequentially created for institutional investors who require different protection against 
risks of the Mortgage-backed securities. 
In July 1986，another type of derivative Mortgage-backed security was 
introduced by Fannie Mae, the stripped Mortgage-backed security (SMBS). As the 
principal and interest are divided unequally between the two classes of bonds in the 
stripped Mortgage-backed securities, the two bond classes have different synthetic 
coupon rates and perform differently from the underlying collateral when interest rates 
changed. In the second generation of SMBS, all interest is distributed to one bond 
class while all principal is distributed to another class. This investment features allow 
institutional investors to create synthetic securities with risk/return characteristics and 
to hedge a portfolio of pass-through securities. 
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Secondary Mortgage-backed Securities Market 
Mortgage pass-through securities are traded and quoted in the same manner 
as U.S. Treasury coupon securities. The secondary exchange markets for Mortgage-
backed securities are New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange. 
Mortgage pass-through securities traded on the market can be specified or 
unspecified in which the underlying pools are still unspecified. The unspecified trade is 
known as a "TBS" (to be announced) trade which gives an advantage to the seller. 
According to the guidelines for standards of delivery and settlement of mortgage-
backed securities established by the Public Securities Association, an under- or 
overdelivery tolerance of 2.5 percent per million traded is allowed. This means that if 
US$ 1 million of par value is sold at par, the seller may deliver pass-throughs with a 
par value between US$ 975,000 and US$ 1,025,000. This delivery option is valuable. 
If the interest rates decline between the trade date and the settlement date, the value of 
pass-through will rise and thus the seller can deliver a less than US$ 1 million pool and 
vice versa. Thus most trades occurred is unspecified. 
The availability of a wide variety of Mortgage-backed securities, an active 
secondary market which inproves the liquidity of the instruments and the presence of a 
risk-free securities for investors enable the establishment of a mature Mortgage-backed 
securities in US. The development of U.S. Mortgage-backed securities market is 
summarized in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. MBS MARKET 
• i n n i i E B s i i M i n s D B & a i i i H H B i i B i a H n E B E B a H i n m s z H i i 
滋 Creation of Federal 滋 Creation of GNMA 猫 Creation of FHLMC • First FHLMC GMC 後 First CMO (1983) 
Home Loan Bank (1968) (1970) (1975) 
(FHLB) System 滋 Market dominated by 
(1932) 游 FNMA privatized 凝 First GNMA pass- 簽 First non-agency non-agency issues 
(1968) through (1970) transaction (1977) 
錄 Creation of FNMA 滋 SMMEA legislation 
(193g) m Pool insurance used enacted (1984) 
as credit enhancement 
(1979) 
^^ ^^ ^^ HHIPilllllHII^ HHHI fll^^HBHHIIIIRHHHHI^H IH^^ IH r^iBIIISIHII^ HI^ H II^ ^^ ^^ ^HVRRSHIH I^IHH 
錄 Introduction of m REMIC status for • First ARM 滋 Privatization of 滋 Creation of RTC 
conduits CMO’s securitization FHLMC 
後 Moody's begins 
築 $20 billion of 嫁 First senior/sub m Initiation of FNMA • First UK mortgage unsolicited ratings •!, 
issuance structure REMIC program securitization 
m Introduction of risk 
丨兹 $50 billion of 兹 Initiation of FHLMC based coital 
issuance REMIC program 
• • • B S a H I I I • • • n S H H I • • • • B m H I • H B S S m H • • • • E S 9 I H I 
• First Australian • First Spanish 激 Total MBS issuance 银 Dramatic expansion m First public Canadian 
mortgage mortgage suipasses $1 trillion of subordinate piece mortgage 
securitization securitization market securitization 丨 
m Trading of 後 First Swedish ^ First Danish CMO 
subordinate pieces mortgage 
begins securitization 豫 Initiation of GNMA 
REMIC program 
•懲.$250 billion of 
issuance 




THE HONG KONG MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKET 
Hong Kong has a well developed stock market. It has one of the biggest 
stock exchanges in the world. But, Hong Kong's debt capital market is still under 
developing and has a long way to catch up with the United States. Hong Kong's first 
Mortgage-backed bonds sale came out until 1994 whereas Mortgage-backed securities 
now is the predominant capital market instrument traded in the United States. In this 
chapter，we will give a brief picture of Hong Kong Mortgage-backed securities market. 
Mortgage Pool 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority conducted a survey on residential mortgage 
loans in Hong Kong in October 1994.[HKMA，1994]^  A total of 33 authorized 
institutions (AIs) which accounted for over 90% of total residential mortgage loans in 
Hong Kong were involved in this survey. 
Characteristics of residential mortgage loans in Hong Kong 
In the report, we found the following characteristics of residential mortgage 
loans in Hong Kong: 
1 Hong Kong Monetary Authority, "Report on the Survey of Residential Mortgages in Hong Kong," 
Hong Kong Monetary Autheoritv，24 January, 1995，p.l-p.l6. 
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• the total outstanding amount of residential mortgage loans were HK$266 billion 
which was made up by a total of 338,249 residential mortgage loans. The average 、 
outstanding amount per loan was HK$787，000. 
• The outstanding loan-to-valuation ratio which measures the ratio of the 
outstanding loan amount to the appraised value of the property at origination or 
refinancing was at 53.5%. 
• A major proportion of residential mortgage loans (68.2%) involved fairly new 
property，of less than 10 years old. Those between 10 and 20 years old accounted 
for 22.8%, while property over 20 years old accounted for only 9%. The average 
contractual life of the outstanding mortgage loans, was about 183 months. The 
loans were on average seasoned for about 22.6 months, and hence the remaining 
contractual life averaged 160.2 months. 
• 96.5% involved property were owner-occupied. Loans involving non-occupied 
property accounted for only 3.5%. 
• Broken by loan purpose, 94.5% of total outstanding loans were for financing the 
purchase of flats. Refinancing loans accounted for 5.5%. 
• Around 96% of mortgage loans were arranged on floating rate basis and only 4% 
on fixed rate basis. For loans on floating rate terms, around 63% involved a 
repayment scheme under which interest rate adjustment was made to the monthly 
installment amount. That is, the amount of monthly installment would be varied 
according to any mortgage rate adjustment, leaving the length of contractual 
maturity unchanged. 
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• Except for 0.2% of the floating rate loans whose set with reference to HIBOR or 
deposit rates, the mortgage rate of the remaining 99.8% of floating rate loans were 
based upon the Best Lending Rate (BLR). 
• Charge would be inposed on complete prepayment within the first year from loan 
origination. The penalties ranged from 2 to 5 months，interests or 3% of original 
loan amount. 
Lending policy of authorized institutions since 1989 
The lending policy has been changed all the time. Listed below is the most 
significant changes on the lending policy for the past few years: 
• The maximum loan to valuation ratio showed a notable decline since 1990 which 
reflected the prudent lending policy of AIs in the face of the property market 
boom For small to medium flats, the ratio dropped from 88.5% in 1990 to 69.5% 
in September 1994. For luxurious flats, the ratio fell from 87.1% to 54.8%. The 
maximum repayment periods still remained at around 20 years. 
• The premium which the mortgage rate fetched over the BLR increased in the past 
few years. For small to medium flats, it was from 0.9% - 1.5% in 1989, but 
increased to 1.3% - 2.1% in September 1994. For luxurious flats, the spread 
increased from 0.9% - L5% in 1989 to 1.5% - 2.4% in September 1994. The rise 
was partly to discourage speculative activities in the property market, and partly 
reflecting an increased risk in property lending with the rapid rises in property 
prices. 
Table 2 summarizes the lending policy of reporting AIs since 1989. 
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TABLE 2 
LENDING POLICY OF REPORTING AIs SINCE 1989 
Lending Policy 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | 9 3 ~ Sept 94 
Maximum loan to 
valuation (%) 
• small to medium flats 88.3 88.5 75.9 72.2 70.8 69.5 
• luxurious flats 86.8 87.1 72.9 69.5 64.6 54.8 
Maximum repayment 
period (no. of years) 
• small to medium flats 21.0 21.2 21.2 21.2 20.9 20.8 
• luxurious flats 20.1 20.2 20.2 20.2 20.0 19.9 
Spread over BLR (%) 
• small to medium flats 0.9-1.5 1.0-1.5 1.1-2.0 1.2-2.2 1.2-2.0 1.3-2.1 
• luxurious flats 0.9-1.5 1.0-1.5 1.1-2.0 1.2-2.2 1.2-2.0 1.5-2.4 
% of reporting AIs 
accepting equitable charge 
• small to medium flats 90.9 90.9 90.9 81.8 78.8 78.8 
• luxurious flats 84.8 84.8 84.8 78.8 75.8 75.8 
Maximum ratio of 
installment to income of 
boiTowers(%) 
• smaU to medium flats 50.2 50.2 50.6 49.9 48.9 48.7 
• luxurious flats 50 j _ 50.2 50.5 49.9 48.9 48.7 
% of reporting AIs 
requiring income 
verification 
• small to medium flats 93.9 93.9 100 100 100 100 
• luxurious flats 93.9 93.9 97.0 97.0 97.0 _ 9 7 . 0 
% of reported AIs 
requiring employment 
verification 
• small to medium flats 75.8 75.8 75.8 78.8 78.8 78.8 
• luxurious flats 72.7 72.7 72.7 75.8 75.8 7 5 . 8 _ 
% of reporting AIs which 39.4 39.4 39.4 45.5 45.5 45.5 
conduct credit test 
% of reporting AIs which W s 78.8 81.8 81.8 81.8 81.8 
value the property by 
independent valuation 
agents 
% of reporting AIs 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 6.1 
requiring life insurance 
% of reporting AIs ~ ^ ~ 97.0 97.0 97.0 97.0 97.0 
requiring fire insurance L _ _ _ 
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% of reporting AIs 
requiring standard 
documentation 
• application form 87.9 90.9 90.9 93.9 93.9 93.9 
• offering letter or loan 87.9 87.9 87.9 87.9 87.9 87.9 
agreement duly 
accepted by customer 
• other standard 
documents 69.7 69.7 69.7 69.7 69.7 69.7 








% of reporting AIs which 455 45.5 48.5 48.5 51.5 57.6 
imposed other policies on 
residential mortgages 1 
value above which l 2 2.5 3.8 3.9 4.9 5.5 
property is classified as 
luxurious flats ($mn) 
gross floor above which ^ 982 982 982 983 983 
property is classified as 
luxurious flats (sq. ft) 
Source： Survey on Residential Mortgages in Hong Kong," Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 
October 1994. 
Development Of MBS 
International bank regulators require banks to reserve capital against a 
percentage of their total assess. As Hong Kong banks can have up to 40 per cent of 
their loan portfolios in mortgages, the amount of money they must set aside is large. 
Securitization allows lenders to sell off big chunks of assets, lowering the reserve 
requirements. 
The Mortgage-backed bond market in Hong Kong got underway in 1994. 
Four bond sales backed by residential mortgage loans totaling HK$3 billion were 
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offered in 1994.[SCMP, 1/16/95]^  Each of the financing was divided into a series of 
tranches of floating rate securities with maturities ranging from one year to 7 1/2 years. 
Interest rates on these securities were 75-500 basis points more that the one-month 
Hong Kong inter-bank offered rate (HIBOR). 
Four Mortgage-backed Bond Sales 
Three out of these four Mortgage-backed bond sales were originated by 
international commercial banks via their Hong Kong branches. They are Bank Of 
America (Asia), Citibank and Standard Chartered Bank. Li Ka-Shing's Cheung Kong 
Holdings, Hong Kong's premier property developer, so far is the only one property 
developer who originated Mortgage-backed securities in Hong Kong. 
Bank Of America (Asia) - May, 1994 
This MBS transaction placed by Salomon Brothers was completed in May, 
1994. It was structured as a simple pass-through with the idea that it would be easier 
for first-time MBS buyers to understand. 
Both the senior and subordinated classes were paid down on pro-rata basis 
and had a weighted average life of 3.6 years based on an estimated 20% pre-payment 
rate. Class A totaled HK$325 million and was placed with investors at one-month 
HIBOR plus 137.5 basis point. The subordinated Class B added up to HK$24.5 
million and paid one-month HIBOR plus 350 basis point. A cash reserve account 
1 Bloomberg, "HK Bond Market Faces Another Difficult Year," South China Morning Post. January 
16,1995. 
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totaling HK$1.75 million provided by BA Asia acted as credit enhancement. The deal 
was not rated as the rating agencies were not ready to rate the deal Salomnan 
Brothers hoped their next deal would be rated as a rating would be a significant 
development for MBS transactions. It would inprove both the liquidity and depth of 
investors who were interests in this type of paper. Moody's Investors Service started 
developing a rating criteria for MBS in Hong Kong. 
The deal was placed with investors in Hong Kong and Japan as well as non-
Asian investors. According to Salonman Brothers, the most interest they received 
were from yield-driven investors. People were not going to trade out of this, they 
bought it for the yield. 
Citibank's Homes-1 - July, 1994 
This multi-class mortgage backed floating rate securities totaled HK$1 
billion was originated by Citibank Hong Kong. This was the region's first public deal. 
Goldman Sachs (Asia) Limited and Citicorp International Limited acted as joint-lead 
managers placed this transaction in July，1994. 
Class A1 totaled HK$620 million and was sold at 90 basis point over 
HIBOR for a 1.2-year average life. The HK$280 million Class A2 had a 4.1-year 
average life and was paid at 175 basis point over HIBOR. The subordinated class B 
totaled HK$100 million had a 8.4-year average life and was paid at 500 basis point 
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over HIBOR. All the over expected weighted average life was estimated based on a 
25% assumed prepayment speed. 
The deal was backed by 1,729 owner-occupied mortgages from Citibank's 
portfolio. Average seasoning of the pool was three years and average loan size was 
HK$600,000. The current loan-to-value ratio was 58%. The average debt to income 
ratio of the mortgage holders is 45% - higher than U.S. Standard but relatively low in 
Hong Kong as some developers allowed a 60% to 70% debt-to-income ratio. 
Conpared to BA's deal, the Citi transaction's sequential-pay structure might 
attract wider range of investors. Here, the A1 class was paid first which accounted for 
the shorter 1.2-year average life. The short class appealed both to investors who were 
nervous about Hong Kong's fate after 1997 and typical CD-buyers who were in search 
of some extra yield. The class A2's average life was five months longer than BA's 
deal, but investors were compensated with the higher spread - 175 basis point. The 
subordinated class met the investors who demanded a high yield. 
The deal was not rated due to the same reason as BA，s deal. According to 
Tim Kelley, Citibank's senior vice president, the bank might issues another MBS 
transaction in the future. In further issues, the bank would attenpt to broaden the 
marketability of the securities to investors outside Hong Kong. Obtaining a rating will 
be a must. 
Cheung Kong Holdings - September, 1994 
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Li Ka Shing's Cheung Kong Holdings, Hong Kong's premier property 
developer, sold HK$686 million of bonds backed by loans from its biggest residential 
project，Kingswood Villas in Yuen Long. U.S. investment bank Merrill Lynch 
underwrote the bond sale. 
The financing included two U.S.dollar-denominated tranches, which totaled 
US$49.6 million. The other two were denominated in Hong Kong dollars and totaled 
HK$303.4 million. The price of U.S.doUar tranches was pegged to the one-month 
London inter-bank offered rate (LIBOR). The Hong Kong dollar bonds were priced 
against the Hong Kong prime lending rate. The largest U.S.doUar tranche, Class A1 
was worth US$32 million and had an average life of 1.3-year. It was paid at 90 basis 
point over LIBOR. The Class A2 U.S.doUar tranche totaled US$17.6 million, had a 
3.9-year average life with an interest at 135 basis point over LIBOR. Class A3 Hong 
Kong dollar bonds totaled 131.7 million, had a 6.5-year average life was paid at 50 
basis point over prime lending rate. Class B, totaled HK$68.7 million, had a 9.3-year 
average life with an interest of 125 basis point over prime lending rate. The CPR 
(constant prepayment rate) assun^tion for the loans backing the Cheung Kong bonds 
was 12%. 
It was the first rated Mortgage-backed securities issue in Hong Kong. The 
financing corrprised four floating rate tranches, three of which were rated by Moody's 
Investors Service and Standard & Poor's. The ratings agencies assigned A3/A ratings 
to each tranche. 
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This was the first MBS transaction originated by a property developer. 
Other property development companies which had made loans to help selling 
apartments were expected to follow Cheung Kong's lead and securitize their 
mortgages as this would raise fresh funds and relieve the company of the burden of 
administering a portfolio of mortgages. 
Standard Chartered Bank's MARS - December, 1994 
With underwriters Goldman Sachs and Standard Chartered Asia, the Hong 
Kong branch of Standard Chartered Bank sold HK$1 billion of mortgage backed 
bonds in December, 1994. This was the fourth Mortgage-backed bond sales in Hong 
Kong in 1994. 
The financing corrprised two senior tranches and one subordinated tranche, 
the structure and pricing were very similar to the Citibank's Homes-1 deal which was 
also arranged by Goldman Sachs. The largest tranche, of HK$500 million, was named 
Class A1 Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes had an average life of 1.2 years and 
paid interest at 90 basis point over HIBOR. Another tranche, of HK$400 million, was 
called Class A2 Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes which could be offered as a 
non-callable bond or a callable security. Without the call option, it had a 5.3-year 
average life, with the option, it had a 5.0-year average life. The interest rate for this 
tranche was at 175 basis point over HIBOR. Class A1 and A2 had an ‘Al’ rating from 
Moody's Investors Service and ‘A，from Standard & Poor，s. The average life of the 
third tranche, of HK$100 million, Class B Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes was 
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7.3 years if the tranche did not include a call option. With the option, it was 6.2 years. 
This tranche was paid at 500 basis point over HIBOR. The CPR (constant prepayment 
rate) assumption for the pool of loans backing the Standard Chartered was 20% a year. 
The deal was backed by 1,775 owner-occupied residential mortgages from Standard 
Chartered Bank's portfolio. The interest margin had a weighted average of 120 basis 
point over the prime lending rate. Average seasoning of the pool was 43 months and 
the average remaining term to maturity was 174 months. The current loan-to-value 
ratio was 71%. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION ON HONG KONG 
MORTGAGED-BACKED SECURITIES MARKET 
The present Mortgage-backed securities market in Hong Kong is very small. 
It accounts for only 0.1 percent of the whole capital market. As con^are with the 
mature, well-developed U.S. Capital market, Hong Kong Mortgage-backed securities 
market is much under-developed. In the following, we shall examine the reasons for 
the slow growth of market in Hong Kong. 
Why is the Mortgage-backed Securities Market Less Important in Hons Kong 
In Hong Kong capital market, the total common stock and corporate bonds 
outstanding are about HK$ 3 trillion and HK$ 50 billion respectively versus there is 
only a total of four Mortgage-backed securities for a sum of HK$ 3 billion in the 
market. Apart from the fact that the emerging Mortgage-backed securities market is 
just situated in the slow-growing introductory stage of the product life cycle, the 
following factors may hinder its rapid growth. 
Uncertain Political Environment of Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is now under the administration of the United Kingdom 
Government with a Governor appointed by The Queen. With effect from 1 July 1997, 
sovereignty over Hong Kong will be transferred from the United Kingdom 
Government to the Government of the People's Republic of China to become a Special 
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Administrative Region (SAR) of China. An agreement between the Governments of 
the United Kingdom and China regarding this transfer is made and embodied in the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration 
provides that the Hong Kong SAR shall be directly under the authority of the China 
Government and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. The Basic Law further states 
that the HK Dollars will be freely convertible and circulate as the legal tender in the 
Hong Kong SAR after 1997. No exchange control policies will be applied in the Hong 
Kong SAR. 
Regarding the lands in Hong Kong, almost all lands in Hong Kong is held 
under fixed term leases from the Government. Most leases of property in the New 
Territories have been extended to 2047. For those in Kowloon and Hong Kong Island, 
some leases have an automatic right of renewal while some leases are not automatically 
renewable or the right to renew have already been exercised. The granting of, and the 
terms of any renewal of these expired leases after 1997 will be at the discretion of the 
Government of the Hong Kong SAR. Thus, it should be noted that no mortgage loan 
has a term longer than the unexpired term of lease of the related property. 
Although the Joint Declaration and Basic Law state that the current social 
and economic system in Hong Koiig shall remain unchanged for a period of fifty years 
after 1997，the future of Hong Kong, in fact，depends on the relationship between 
British and China Government. It is uncertain whether Hong Kong shall retain the 
status of an international financial center after the transfer of sovereignty in 1997. The 
prosperity of property market and the future performance of mortgage loans in Hong 
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Kong is unclear. The blur of the future is a major obstacle to the development of 
Mortgage-backed securities market in Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong Residential Property Price Inflation 
In Hong Kong, the price of residential properties rose substantially during 
the period from 1990 to the first quarter of 1994. As the price rose in an 
uncontrollable manner, the Hong Kong Government expressed concern to this trend 
and set up a task force, the Task Force on Land Supply and Property Prices，to 
evaluate alternatives to slow the growth in property prices. In June 1994, the Task 
Force recommended a number of measures to eradicate the false pressure on prices. It 
includes reducing the developers' quota for private sales from 50 percent of 
unconvicted flats to 10 percent, restricting the period of forward sales to nine months, 
increasing the initial deposit to 10 percent of the purchase price in which half of it will 
be non-refundable, and redefining the date for completion of construction as the date 
of compliance with the lease conditions or the consent to assign etc. 
Upon the introduction of new measures, the property price declines 
drastically over 10 percent within six months. A decline in the price of residential 
properties obviously affects the performance of borrowers in making payments of 
interest and principal Le. increases the default and delinquency risk of the mortgage 
loans. This probably would have an adverse effect on the ability of issuers to pay 
interest and principal to security-holders. To introduce Mortgage-backed securities in 
this tough year, 1994, most investors will prefer delay or even retrieve their investment 
until a steady and clear picture of the Hong Kong property market could be observed. 
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Limited Liquidity 
Currently, there is no secondary market for Mortgage-backed securities. 
That means there is no trading of the securities, no price fluctuations, and no way for 
investors to gauge a fair price on a mortgage bond. Securities-holders could not sell 
their securities in market when capital is needed. The illiquidity of securities restricts 
the hedging opportunities and will cause the funding of securities very expensive. 
Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether such market will be developed in future. In 
addition, it is unsure if such market will affect the sale of the securities or the securities 
may be sold at a discount to the initial issue price. 
Few Securities with Credit Ratings 
Mortgage-backed securities are complicated as they do not have a uniform 
structure. Most of the public do not understand how a Mortgage-backed securities 
financing works. As it is difficult for the public to acquire information on the security, 
to assess the riskiness of the issuing organizations and the collateral of securities, it 
inplicitly in^oses a significant transaction cost for the investors on the security. 
Credit rating is one of the easiest and important reference for the public to get a brief 
picture on the security. However, not all issuing securities carry published credit 
ratings by major international rating agencies. Thus, the lack of knowledge on the 
security, the collateral in the securities and the issuing organizations lowers the 
attractiveness of Mortgage-backed securities to the public. 
Risks of Mortgage-backed Securities 
Holding the securities is not free of risks. Although there are various 
structural protections to lessen the risks, the measures cannot eliminate all generic 
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risks. As a result, there is no assurance that payment of interest and principal on the 
securities could be made on a timely basis. The following is a summary of major 
generic risks of Mortgage-backed securities. 
Basis Risk 
The interest rates of the mortgage loans are subject to fluctuation at the 
discretion of the mortgagee. It is the general practice that mortgage rates are 
determined by reference to a margin over Hong Kong Prime. Hong Kong Prime is an 
administrated rate which is set from time to time at the discretion of the Hong Kong 
Association of Banks. The income payments on the securities are based on Hong 
Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) which is a market driven rate. The history of 
the Prime spread and HIBOR over the past ten years are shown as Chart 2: 
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CHART 2 
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i Source: “Presentation Regarding Mortgage Backed Securitisation for Standard Chartered Bank, 
音 Hnng Knng ” Standard Chartered Bank, Hong Kong Branch, August 12，1994. 
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As shown in the above diagram, the difference between the two rates is not 
constant. Owing to a rise in HIBOR or a reduction in Hong Kong Prime, it may be 
possible that there will be insufficient fiinds for issuers to make scheduled payments of 
interest and principal to the security-holders even though all amounts due in respect of 
the mortgage loans are being paid in full and on time. Furthermore, as there is a 
priority of payments to different classes of securities-holders, the Class B security-
holders may result not only a reduction in the pre-tax yield to maturity, but also a 
principal loss on their investment. 
Mortgage Loan Prepayment 
The mortgage loans may be repaid in full or in part at any time. A variety of 
political, economic, social and demographic factors including homeowner mobility, 
economic conditions, property prices, mortgage interest rates and the availability of 
mortgage funds, may affect the prepayment experience of the mortgage loans. 
If a borrower prepays his mortgage loan in whole or in part, he owes interest 
on the principal prepaid only up to the date of prepayment. Accordingly, if he makes 
an unscheduled prepayment of principal in a collection period prior to the usual 
scheduled payment date, the issuer will not earn any interest on that unscheduled 
prepayment of principal from the date of prepayment to the immediately succeeding 
mortgage payment date. As a result, there will be a reduction in the anticipated 
interest receipts available to the issuer for such period. 
For the first nine months of 1994，the complete and partial prepayment 
recorded are HK$ 27.3 billion and HK$ 2.8 billion, corresponding to 1.0 percent and 
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10.3 percent of the total outstanding loans respectively.[HKMA, 1995] ^  Although the 
prepayment risk is not serious in Hong Kong and the originators have made reference 
to the historical trend, no assurance can be given that prepayments on the mortgage 
loans will conform to any historical experience of the originator and no prediction can 
be made as to the actual prepayment rates which will be experienced on the mortgage 
loans. Thus, the anticipated interest is actually uncertain. 
Delinquent and Default Risk 
The issuer's obligation to pay interest on and to repay the securities infiillis 
limited by receipts from the outstanding mortgage loans. Security-holders must rely 
on payments being made under the mortgages. If mortgagors fail to make their 
monthly mortgage payments when due，it is probably that the issuer may have 
insufficient funds to make full and timely payments of current interest and eventual 
payment of principal to the holders. If mortgagor defaults on payment and the servicer 
seeks to enforce the mortgage and take possession of the property, the time required 
to sell the property and to realize the proceeds of sale is uncertain. Any delay and loss # 
incurred under such circumstances may affect the ability of issuer to make payments to 
security-holders. 
The performance of borrowers in making payments of interest and principal 
under the mortgage loans is affected by many factors, particularly the property price. 
The number and amount of delinquency/default is adversely related to the property 
1 Hong Kong Monetary Authority, "Report on the Survey of Residential Mortgages in Hong Kong" 
Hong Kong Monetary Autheoritv，24 January, 1995, p.4-p.l 1. 
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price. Table 3 shows the number and amount of delinquent/default loans from 1983 to 
1994 by 3 major authorized institutions. 
TABLE 3 
NUMBER AND AMOUNT OF DELINQUENT/DEFAULT LOANS 
REPORTED BY 3 MAJOR AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS 
DURING 1983-1994 
No. of days from I 83 | 84 I 85 I 86 I 87 I 88 I 89 I 90 I 91 I 92 93 Sept. 
payment due date 21-
61-90 days N o . l o " " 46 30 29 34 53 ~ 61 37 39 26 
Amount (HKSmn) 17 16 10___7___5___12 31 44 19 17 20 21 
91-120 days No. 148 139 57 45 25 30 57 68 30 27 13 12 
Amount (HK$nin) 43.3 42.6 14.9 9.1 3 5.2_ 324 37 :Z i2 : l l L3 . iM J A 
Over 121 days N o . ^ W W 8 11 5 11 7 8 17 20 17 
Amount (HKSmn) 29.5 22.7 9.6 2.3 2.6 1.5 3.4 2.2 2 6.5 16.6 9.9 
Total No. 29.5 267 135 ' W 65 69 121 145 74 81 72 55 
Amount (HKSmn) 90.8 80.3 34.8118.41 9.6 17.7 66.8 83.9 38.7 43.8 50.5 38.5 
Source: "Report on the Survey of Residential Mortgages in Hong Kong," Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority, October 1994. 
There is no assurance that delinquent and default experience on mortgages 
will conform to any historical experience, and thus no prediction can be made as to the 
actual delinquent and default rates which will be experienced on mortgages. Security-
holders will bear the investment risk resulting from the delinquent and default 
experience of the mortgages. 
Deductions 
Any withholding or deduction for interest payment or income distributions 
of the securities such as withholding taxes and staxnp duties, is not obliged to the 
issuers. The issuers are not responsible for any additional payment for security-holders 




RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE OF HONG KONG 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKET 
Having an understanding of factors which may affect the growth of 
Mortgage-backed securities market in short term, a number of recommendations are 
proposed in this chapter to facilitate the market development. Furthermore, we shall 
forecast the prospect of Mortgage-backed securities market in Hong Kong. 
Recommendations for Hong Kong Mortgage-backed Securities Market 
To enhance the development and popularity of Mortgage-backed securities 
in Hong Kong, a number of factors have to be in^roved. They include credit 
enhancement of securitized products, better market infrastructure and liquid bond 
markets. 
Credit Enhancement of Securitized Products 
To gain confidence of the public on Mortgage-backed securities, it needs to 
help the public understand and acquire knowledge on the product at a low cost. 
Firstly, issuers should develop a uniform structure for these financings and to address 
the risks unique for this security. Secondly, issuers should obtain published credit 
ratings by major international rating agencies on their securities to help the public 
access the securitized products and the issuing organizations. In fact, some securities 
have already carried credit rating when issued. Last but not least, issuers should 
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enhance the credit ratings on the collateral in the securities to increase its attractiveness 
to the investors. 
Securitized products often obtain a higher rating than the rating of the seller 
of the assets. However, this is only possible by separating the credit of assets from the 
credit of seller. Rating agencies require the transfer of assets to be regarded as a "true 
sale" of the assets under applicable law and accounting standards rather than a pledge 
or hypothecation of the assets to achieve the necessary separation. In addition to the 
separation of credit quality of assets from the credit of seller, several forms of credit 
enhancement can be used to achieve a better rating. They include: 
參 overcoUateralization or "subordination" by provision of two or more classes of 
securities with different privileges 
• reserve or "spread" accounts which are funded by an initial deposit by the seller 
and/or by excess cash flow received from the assets over time 
• financial guaranty insurance on the securities from a monoline insurance company 
• pool insurance on the pool of assets from a pool insurance company 
• bank letters of credit 
• seller or other corporate guarantees 
Better Market Infrastructure 
A set of good institutional infrastructure are essential for the development of 
a securitization market. A clearly understood legal system governing the financial 
assets，the related securities and the financial agencies can ensure a fair trade of 
financial instrument. A sophisticated asset monitoring systems can protect the 
57 
security-holders to lessen their risks. A constructive regulatory environment and 
documentary precedent can assist issuers and borrowers to follow the rules of games 
to facilitate growth of market. Of course, positive government attitude towards the 
debt instrument such as streamlining the application process of listing debt securities in 
market，a higher acceptance to debt instrument by the public, advanced communication 
system and good supportive systems are also crucial for the success of market. Thus, 
in order to boost up the Mortgage-backed securities market in Hong Kong, a number 
of proper institutional infrastructure has to be established. 
Liquid Bond Markets 
Similar to bonds, Mortgage-backed security is a debt instrument. The 
Mortgage-backed securities market grows side by side with the local bond market. 
The lack of a secondary market for long-term bonds and Mortgage-backed securities 
affects the liquidity of investment and limits the hedging opportunities leading to the 
under-development of debt instrument in Hong Kong. Fortunately, with the 
introduction of Exchange Fund Bills and Notes in November 1991, the situation has 
been inproved as it could be sold short. Together with a sharp increase in the number 
and size of infrastructure projects in the region such as Hong Kong's new airport, a 
great demand for long-term debt funding will substantially boost up the secondary 
, market for bonds. With the development of secondary bond market underpinning a 
secondary Mortgage-backed securities market, active trading of Mortgage-backed 
securities will become available. More potential issuers and investors of Mortgage-
backed securities will have incentives to join the market. The popularity of Mortgage-
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backed securities will be enhanced. Thus, in^roving the liquidity of Mortgage-backed 
securities can make the security quick sellers. 
The Future Mortgage-backed Securities Market in Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong Mortgage-backed securities market gets a tough year in 
1994. At present, a number of factors including the lack of uniformity in structuring, 
conplicated prospectuses and illiquidity, are likely to hinder the growth of Mortgage-
backed securities market in Hong Kong in the short term. Furthermore, the growth of 
market highly depends on how people feel about the future property price. The 
wobbliness in the property market in 1994 increases the uncertainty of defaults which 
affects the development of an embryonic market.[SCMP, 1/16/1995]^  Hence the 
nascent development of the Mortgage-backed securities market may be slow and 
tedious. However, a number of other factors suggest that the prospects for the market 
are good. 
, T h e rapid development of Hong Kong Stock Market and Banking Sector, 
along with the growth of the economy, indicates that financial resources are abundant 
in Hong Kong. If the debt financing instruments are appropriately structured and an 
active secondary market is established for trading of the securities, a fertile source of 
capital are available for debt financing. The favorable response to the Dragon Bond 
and Hong Kong dollar debt issues by supranational reflects the considerable wealth 
which has been amassed in the past decades of hypergrowth.[HKB, 1994]^  Since 
Mortgage-backed securities possess a more favorable feature than the standard 
1 Bloomberg, "HK Bond Market Faces Another Difficult Year," South China Morning Post, January 
16，1995. 
2 Hong Kong Bank, 'The Prospects for Hong Kong's debt Market" Economic Report 1994. 
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corporate bonds such as a substantially higher interest rate and a more stable and 
predictable return，it is believed that Mortgage-backed securities should be more 
attractive than bonds to mobilize the large pool of savings. 
Despite the lots of hurdles that issuers have to jump over in developing the 
Mortgage-backed securities market in Hong Kong, many issuers are still very positive 
about the future of the market. Chase Manhattan is planning a mortgage bond sale in 
this year while Bank of America (Asia) is studying the second issue of Mortgage-
backed securities in Hong Kong. In fact, besides Mortgage-backed securities, many 
financial issuers start to examine the feasibility of other asset-backed securities to 
broaden the investor base. Citicorp Commercial Finance (HK) Ltd., a special con^any 
of the Hong Kong branch of Citibank，plans to issue a HK$ 500 million automobile-
loan backed bonds in 1995 and an asset-backed transaction securitized with credit card 
receivable is being studied and plans to be issued in late 1995. In sum, the future of 
the Mortgage-backed securities market is very bright. 
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